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National Defense Budgeting and Congressional Controls

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June 2012

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NATIONAL DEFENSE BUDGETING AND CONGRESSIONAL CONTROLS

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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NATIONAL DEFENSE BUDGETING AND CONGRESSIONAL CONTROLS

ABSTRACT

In 1992 Jones and Bixler (*Mission Financing to Realign National Defense*, JAI Press) examined different factors (internalities, externalities) within the federal budget process and identified certain tendencies, trends, and relationships in congressional control over defense through the budget process. This study occurred at the end of the Cold War. The national security situation of the United States has been quite different over the past 20 years. Further, the federal budget context has been different as mandatory spending has taken a larger share and budget surpluses were achieved and lost. Debates over the right level of spending are increasing now as both fiscal and security issues are driving Congress, Department of Defense (DoD), and the White House to reexamine defense spending. This project examines the assertions in Jones and Bixler to determine if they remain valid through comparisons of their Cold War data with data collected during a relative period of peace (post-Cold War to 9/11) and a period of war (post 9/11 to 2011).

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AUTH	Authorization
AVG	Average
BOB	Bureau of the Budget
CBO	Congressional Budget Office
CRA	Continuing Resolution Appropriation
CRS	Congressional Research Service
DoD	Department of Defense
FY	Fiscal Year
GAO	General Accountability Office
GOVT	Government
HAC	House Appropriations Committee
HASC	House Armed Services Committee
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
SAC	Senate Appropriations Committee
SASC	Senate Armed Services Committee
STD	Standard

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

Jones and Bixler (1992) provided a broad look at Cold War era patterns of congressional control over defense through the budget process. Their study occurred at the end of the Cold War. The national security situation of the United States has changed significantly over the past 20 years. Further, the federal budget context has been different as mandatory spending takes a larger share and budget surpluses were achieved and lost. Debates over the right level of spending are increasing now as both fiscal and security issues are driving Congress, Department of Defense (DoD), and the White House to reexamine defense spending. This project extends Jones and Bixler's research incorporating the post-Cold War period while examining their assertions determining if they remain valid during a relative period of peace (post-Cold War to 9/11) and a period of war (post 9/11 to 2011).

With defense budget pressures increasing due to future Federal budget constraints, understanding the historical data and trends will help the DoD understand congressional control measures. During the period of relative peace, the DoD budget authority decreased due to a general defense drawdown and for the period of war, the DoD budget authority increased. This thesis will utilize the data from these two periods extending and comparing to Jones and Bixler's Cold War data analyzing congressional control measures of defense budgets. The objective of this thesis will be to determine if certain assertions by Jones and Bixler remain valid beyond their period of study.

B. RESEARCH QUESTION

The primary research question addressed by this thesis is to determine whether the trends and assertions observed by Jones and Bixler remained valid beyond their period of study. To answer this question we will compare the levels of congressional control to defense budgets during a relative period of peace (post-Cold War to 9/11) and a period of war (post 9/11 to 2011).

C. METHODOLOGY

Jones and Bixler (1992) researched and analyzed defense spending during the forty-year period of the Cold War era, identifying trends between defense spending and congressional control. Data analyzed by Jones and Bixler (1992) "indicated that congressional micromanagement of the DoD budget has increased since the 1950s, and particularly since the late 1960s and 1970s" (p. 123). To support their assertion, Jones and Bixler analyzed different causal factors and congressional control methods to explain this increase in oversight and control of the DoD budget by Congress.

Causal factors investigated include: (1) committee and budget reforms within Congress; (2) public attitude toward defense spending; (3) growth and shrinkage of the defense budget; (4) increased spending on uncontrollables within the federal budget and deficit control pressures; and (5) growth of Congressional staff size and expertise in defense matters (Jones & Bixler, 1992, p. 123).

Some of the congressional control methods analyzed include: (1) number of pages in Defense Authorization Bills, Defense Appropriation Bills, Armed Services Committee Reports on DoD Authorization Bills, and Defense Appropriations Committee Reports on the DoD Appropriations Bills; (2) number of General Provisions in the Defense Authorization and Appropriation Bills; (3) the number of Defense Hearings before the Senate and House Armed Services Committees and (4) congressional staff sizes. Jones and Bixler's data covers a period from 1960–1991, the Cold War era.

This thesis extends Jones and Bixler's research and compares their Cold War era research to two distinct periods: (1) a period of relative peace (post-Cold War to 9/11/2001); and (2) a period of war (post 9/11/2001 to 2011). To ensure comparability and consistency of data analysis (to the best extent possible), this thesis replicated Jones and Bixler's methods and data sources.

D. SCOPE

This thesis is a comparative analysis of congressional control of the Department of Defense spanning three specific time periods:

- Jones and Bixler's Cold War Data

- Post-Cold War to 11 September 2001 (relative period of peace)
- Post 11 September 2001 to Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 (period of war)

This thesis will extend the data collected by Jones and Bixler (1992) through FY 2011 in order to evaluate whether the defense spending and congressional control relationships Jones and Bixler asserted remain valid during a relative period of peace, a period of war, the entire time period (1960–2011), and the last 20 years (1992–2011).

This thesis will specifically analyze the following items which are similar to those used by Jones and Bixler:

- Number of pages in Defense Authorization and Appropriation Bills
- Number of pages in the House and Senate Armed Services Committee Reports (HASC, SASC) on Defense Authorization Bills
- Number of pages in the House and Senate Appropriations Committee Reports (HAC, SAC) on Defense Appropriations Bills
- HASC and SASC total number of hearings and number of witnesses
- Number of Defense related General Provisions
- Size of congressional staff

Analysis will determine whether the trends and assertions observed by Jones and Bixler with respect to the DoD budget during the Cold War era remain valid beyond their period of study.

E. ORGANIZATION

Chapter II presents background information on the congressional budget process, origins of congressional control, methods of congressional control utilized, and different ways congressional oversight can be measured.

Chapter III will present selected data from Jones and Bixler (1992) extended to Fiscal Year (FY) 2011. The subsequent data analysis will compare Jones and Bixler's

Cold War-centric data to two specific time periods: a relative period of peace (post-Cold War through 11 September 2001) and a period of war (Post 9/11 through FY 2011).

Chapter IV will present results of the data analysis and recommendations for further study.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. THE POWER TO CONTROL THE BUDGET

1. Constitutional Origins

To understand how congressional controls affect the Department of Defense budget, it is important to understand the history of the congressional budgeting process and how the struggle for control of the budget between the executive and legislative branches led to the current budget process.

The DoD budget proposal from the President is never identical to the budget as appropriated by Congress. The primary reason for this difference stems from Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution which places the power to enact taxes and to spend the monies raised by taxes with Congress while Article I, Section 9 specifies that the only way money can be drawn from the Treasury would be through the "Consequence of Appropriations made by Law" (U.S. Const., art. I, §9). According to Hamilton (2001), the reason for this is clear:

The framers of the Constitution, mindful of "taxation without representation" suffered by colonists under the British crown, took care to specify in the Constitution that the ultimate power to tax and spend resides in the hands of the legislative branch—which is closer to the people—not the Executive Branch (para. 5).

Article I, Section 8 also provides Congress with the power to raise and support armies and to provide and maintain a Navy, which can result in budgetary conflict when Congress does not agree with executive branch recommendations. The differences in priorities between the executive and legislative branches over defense, combined with the external influence of congressional constituencies and lobbyists, ensure that the President's budget proposal and the actual congressional appropriations will never be identical (Schick, 1975).

Although the Constitution establishes the constitutional powers of Congress over taxes and spending, it does not establish any requirement for a budget from the executive

branch, nor does it specify the methodology for executing budgetary legislation. The two statutes that fill these roles are the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 and Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.

2. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921

The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (P.L. 67-13) established the statutory requirement that the President submit a budget to Congress on the first day of each regular session that includes "estimates of the expenditures and appropriations necessary in his judgment for the support of the Government for the ensuing fiscal year" (P.L. 67-13, 1921, §201). It also established the Bureau of the Budget (BOB), later reorganized into the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) by Executive Order 11541 in 1970, to assist the President in budget preparation. "Under any interpretation, establishment of the BOB in 1921 and the crucial tasking of the President to prepare and submit a budget to Congress shifted the power to the executive" (Jones, Candreva, & DeVore, 2012, p. 51).

To mitigate this power shift to the executive branch, P.L. 67-13 also established the General Accounting Office as Congress' auditing agency to act "independent of the executive departments and under the control and direction of the Comptroller General of the United States" (P.L. 67-13, 1921, §301). The GAO's mission "is to support Congress in meeting constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and ensure the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people" (About GAO, 2012).

3. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974

The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344) was passed by Congress on 12 July 1974 in response to continuing budget conflicts between the executive and legislative branches. Specifically, Congress felt that their "power of the purse" was being challenged by President Nixon's impoundment strategy in the early 1970s (Hogan, 1985). Although the use of impoundment goes back to President Jefferson in 1803 (he chose to delay spending \$50,000 appropriated for the purchase of gunboats by over a year), it was President Nixon's usage that provided the spark for Congress to pursue legislation curtailing this power (Damon, 1973). In addition to curtailing the

power of impoundment, P.L. 93-344 provided the foundation for the current congressional budget process, specified the requirement for an annual Budget Resolution, established the House and Senate Budget Committees, and established the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).

In the congressional budget process, the Budget Resolution "sets aggregate spending and taxing totals and estimates the resulting deficit or surplus. It also sets spending totals by functional areas, e.g., defense, transportation, and so on." (Jones, et al, 2012, p. 15) The Budget Resolution (once adopted by Congress) acts as a framework to guide the appropriations committees and subcommittees through the process that provides the individual appropriations bills and acts as a measuring stick for CBO analysis.

The Congressional Budget Office was established to facilitate the aggregation of budgetary information for congressional committees independent of the executive branch. This included:

- (1) information with respect to the budget, appropriation bills, and other bills authorizing or providing budget authority or tax expenditures, (2) information with respect to revenues, receipts, estimated future revenues and receipts, and changing revenue conditions, and (3) such related information as such Committees may request (P.L. 93-344, 1974, 88 Stat 304).

The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 played a crucial role in the establishment of a formal budgeting process and were instrumental in the delineation of budgetary power between the executive and legislative branches of government. P.L. 93-344 placed the budgetary planning function squarely in Congress through establishment of the House and Senate Budget Committees, established their power to modify the executive budget proposal, and established the CBO as Congress' powerful analytical arm to assist congressional members in their budget negotiations with the executive branch (President and OMB) (Jones et al, 2012).

B. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS OVERVIEW

As a consequence of P.L. 93-344, a specific process was put into place to allow Congress to evaluate the President's budget proposal and formalize the procedures that Congress could utilize to modify the proposal if Congress felt that it was necessary to meet the country's budgetary needs for the fiscal year.

Although the budget process is extremely fluid and no two fiscal years will be exactly the same, Section 300 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344), as amended, established a timetable (Table 1) that is intended to keep Congress on pace to complete all budgetary legislation by the start of the new fiscal year.

When the President submits his budget proposal to Congress no later than the first Monday in February it signals the beginning of legislative consideration of the budget and the inevitable interaction between the executive branch and Congress. In the first of a series of steps, various committees and subcommittees evaluate the budget proposal and submit their "views and estimates" on expenditures and receipts to the House and Senate Budget Committees.

These "views and estimates" reports of House and Senate committees provide the Budget Committees with information on the preferences and legislative plans of congressional committees regarding budgetary matters within their jurisdiction (U.S. Library of Congress, 2010).

House and Senate committees submit these reports to their respective House and Senate Budget Committees within six weeks of the President's budget proposal submission. The House and Senate Budget Committees then review this data, utilizing it to draft and markup a Budget Resolution on the budget. The Budget Resolution must be reported in the Senate by 1 April where it will be evaluated on the floor of the House and Senate with a deadline of 15 April for completion of action (P.L. 93-344, 1974, §300).

The Budget Resolution represents a congressional budget plan that consists of spending and taxing targets that will serve as Congress' blueprint for the remainder of the budgeting process. It could also include reconciliation instructions that would affect changes to taxes or mandatory spending e.g., Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security.

Table 1. Congressional Budget Process Timetable (From: U.S. Library of Congress, 2008)

Date	Action
First Monday in February	President submits budget to Congress
February 15	Congressional Budget Office submits economic and budget outlook report to Budget Committees
Six Weeks after President submits budget	Committees submit views and estimates to Budget Committees
April 1	Senate Budget Committee reports budget resolution
April 15	Congress completes action on budget resolution
May 15	Annual appropriation bills may be considered in the House, even if action on budget resolution has not been completed
June 10	House Appropriations Committee reports last annual appropriations bill
June 15	Congress completes action on reconciliation legislation (if required by budget resolution)
June 30	House completes action on annual appropriation bills
July 15	President submits mid-session review of his budget to Congress
October 1	Fiscal year begins

In an ideal scenario Congress adopts the Budget Resolution prior to beginning action on the appropriations bills, signaling a shift to the appropriations process. However, if Congress has not completed action on the Budget Resolution by 15 May, annual appropriation bills can then be considered in the House. At the beginning of the appropriations process for the regular appropriations bills, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees (HAC and SAC) are allocated their spending ceilings as specified in a joint explanatory statement included in the budget resolution conference report. The HAC and SAC sub-allocate this amount among their respective appropriations subcommittees, providing guidance regarding their individual spending ceilings. Each House and Senate subcommittee has responsibility for only one regular appropriations bill (e.g. defense, homeland security, agriculture, etc.).

Each subcommittee is responsible to draft, markup, and report their appropriations bill to the full HAC and SAC who will then scrutinize the bills. After the HAC and SAC have completed their deliberation the bills are passed on to the floor for evaluation, scrutiny, debate, and amendment by the full House and Senate. Once their respective

chambers pass the bills, a conference committee is held that compares the two bills and works to resolve the differences between the two versions. After all differences are resolved the bills go back before the full House and Senate for a vote. Before the bill can be presented to the President for signature into law, both the House and Senate must pass identical legislation (U.S. Const., art. I, §7). As a guideline, appropriations bills are supposed to be out of the House by 30 June and enacted prior to the beginning of the new fiscal year. However, if all the appropriations bills are not enacted by 30 September then Congress must pass a Continuing Resolution Appropriation (CRA) to cover the timeframe from the start of the new fiscal year to the expected date that the remaining appropriations will be enacted.

The purpose of a CRA is to provide governmental agencies and programs with the budget authority to continue to operate during the new fiscal year until the regular appropriations bills have been enacted. In general, a CRA provides temporary funding to governmental agencies and programs at a funding level equal to the previous fiscal year.

The third major appropriation measure is the supplemental appropriation. The supplemental appropriation differs from the CRA and regular appropriation bills in that it will actually serve to increase the funding of regular appropriations already enacted in the fiscal year government budget. Supplemental appropriations are normally in response to an unanticipated need that occurs within the fiscal year that was not budgeted and/or cannot be met by the current regular appropriations. Commonly this need derives from a natural disaster such as a flood or hurricane or an emergent defense need such as contingency operations or the immediate response to 9/11.

After the conference report to resolve differences between the House and Senate appropriations bill is passed, the bill goes to the President to be signed into public law. At this point the President can sign the bill into law, veto the bill and send it back to Congress with his objections for reconsideration, or do nothing. If the President chooses to do nothing, the bill will be considered as if it were signed into law after a period of 10 days. If the President sends the bill back to the Congress for reconsideration, Congress can put it to a vote and if two-thirds approve then the bill becomes law.

C. WHY CONGRESS CONTROLS DEFENSE SPENDING

There are numerous reasons why Congress is actively involved with control and oversight of the defense budget. The main reason is to ensure accountability for the use of taxpayer dollars for national defense. However, politics is a key driving force developing the defense budget with many legislators attempting to influence the process (Stockton, 1995). Some of the reasons analyzed are: (1) to influence national strategy; (2) authorization committee desire to micromanage defense; (3) to influence politics; (4) parochialism; and (5) political ambitions (Lindsay, 1990; Mayer, 1993; Stockton, 1995).

1. National Strategy Influence

National strategy influences are the activities Congress engages in from oversight through the committee system. “The Legislative Act of 1946 (P.L. 79-601) stipulated that congressional committees should exercise continuous watchfulness over those actions of the executive branch that fall within their jurisdiction” (Lindsay, 1990, p. 9). The HASC and SASC are the primary means in which Congress oversees the DoD. Theoretically, the details of the defense budget should be developed in a top-down fashion. After an analytical study of U.S. national security policy and needs, the decision is made on the size, capabilities, and force structure, funding levels for the armed forces is established, and programs necessary to execute the national security objective(s) are enacted (Stockton, 1995). The reality is the executive branch provides the basis for the defense budget funding levels request to Congress for achieving defense policy goals. Congress can and often does alter the executive branch’s request while legislating the individual program’s funding levels sometimes without considering the impact to future national security goals (Stockton, 1995). Programming disputes may also reflect broader disagreements between Congress and the executive branch over direction of defense policy. This can take three forms: “The overall level of defense budget, allocation of defense spending among different defense programs, and the priority of individual programs to fund” (Mayer, 1993, 298). Congress can influence the direction of national security and defense policy through authorizations and appropriations. The power to make line item changes is where Congress gains the ability to influence both overall

national strategy and particular defense activities. The executive branch can set the national security vision, but Congress can directly influence and impact the vision with the power of the purse.

2. Congressional Committee Micromanagement

The HASC and SASC are often viewed as micromanaging the defense budget requests and execution. The HASC and SASC are responsible for DoD authorization. Authorization addresses the creation, continuation or cancellation of an agency or program and the definition, scope, and limits of its powers and responsibilities, but does not provide agencies with budget authority, although they may suggest or authorize spending levels. Additionally, the HASC and SASC are empowered with the legislative oversight of the DoD. The HAC and SAC are responsible for DoD appropriation. Appropriations provide an agency with the legal power to incur financial obligations and make payments (outlays). The appropriation process allocates budget authority to authorized programs (Lee, Johnson, Joyce, 2008). What are some of the reasons for Congress' micromanagement of the DoD?

One of the reasons Congress increased administrative controls in the late 1980s was due to a mistrust of the Pentagon (Mayer, 1993). Congress had decided detailed direction was and still is necessary due to DoD's ability to evade general guidance, requests, and restrictions (Mayer, 1993). Lindsay (1990) argues, "the Pentagon is far better adjusted than most bureaucracies to resist congressional oversight" (p.14). With Congress having the ability from legislative oversight to force compliance on the DoD it would bring about the control measures the legislators wanted. Even with improved DoD compliance, the 1980s level of oversight control legislation still survives.

Congress will reduce oversight control of the DoD only in very unusual times of high uncertainty and imminent threat to national security. However, once Congress understands the uncertainty and imminent threat levels, the traditional congressional control measures are put back into place (Candrea & Jones, 2005).

Another factor is the constant battle between congressional politics versus Pentagon politics. Each has a desired end state goal with long institutional memories, in

some cases their political agendas do not align. The biggest factor in the Congress versus Pentagon politics debate is money and the programs to spend it on. The potential for thousands of units of military hardware and billions of dollars for programs leads to many lobbyist groups all vying for their piece of the defense budget pie. Legislators and lobbyists will politic, gaining coalitions and passing authorization and appropriation levels they think is necessary. Those numbers might differ from what the Pentagon thinks the DoD requirements and needs are, hence the high stakes of Congress versus Pentagon politics (Stockton, 1995).

One more factor is that in the mid-1960s, defense authorization bills had broad funding categories while House and Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittees completed specific funding to individual programs. Since then, the number of line items in the defense budget has significantly increased reinforcing the perception of HASC and SASC micromanagement of programs vice focusing on more long range national security policy (Stockton, 1995). The end result is the growth of HASC and SASC micromanagement of the defense budget from line item budgeting as Congress influences the political nature of the budgetary process.

3. Political Influence

Legislators will “use strategy as a political tool to win votes on budget legislation, both within committees and in Congress as a whole” (Stockton, 1995, p. 237). Budgeting is a political process with compromises and coalitions built from the exchange of votes on various issues and programs. The defense budget is the largest part of the discretionary portion of the federal budget. Members of Congress will compete with each other and the executive branch over national strategy, funding levels, and individual programs to champion (Stockton, 1995). The President and the DoD know who the powerful political players are on the Hill and will target them appropriately in the effort of getting their respective national security and program goals funded at the requested levels. In Washington DC, Congress, through the HASC and SASC, has the political influence to directly impact the congressional control of the defense budget (Lindsay, 1990).

4. Parochialism

Members of Congress want to show their constituents that they are looking out for their interests. Parochialism encourages legislators to add or reduce programs through line item budgetary power. From parochialism, potentially unnecessary spending could be enacted adding waste to the defense budget. Second, alternative programs will have to be discredited and their spending levels reduced or eliminated. The alternative program has their supporters who will counter the budgetary assault resulting in more hearings, reports, oversight, and increase the overall congressional control and micromanagement of the defense budget (Lindsay, 1990).

An example is the B-2 Bomber program that was reduced and eventually cancelled by Congress which then took the funding the President requested for the B-2 and re-apportioned it to other programs in different districts Congress deemed were of greater value (Lindsay, 1990). The competition for those dollars among members of Congress to bring home the money (jobs) to their home districts and voting constituents is very important to them and their reelection prospects. The reality of personal incentives from parochialism leads to increases in congressional control as they fight for scarce resource dollars thru lengthy hearings and documentation either justifying the program or defending it.

5. Political Ambitions

Lastly are the political ambitions of members of Congress. Members of Congress want to improve their station and power. Members of Congress want to win reelections gaining seniority, increase their political influence on the Hill, and win appointment to more powerful posts and committees. One of the ways to establish their congressional credentials is thru policy oversight. Policy oversight is the review, monitoring, and supervision of the federal government. Congressional members will utilize their legislative power to “reign in” programs Congress deems are not following the policies and procedures enacted by Congress. Policy oversight in many instances will increase congressional control of the budgetary process by lengthening the process thru hearings/documentation and add direction for the DoD with policy, procedures, and laws.

In addition, as members of Congress look to climb the ladders of power on the hill, those in power will not give up their positions of influence within Congress without a fight. One of the ways members of Congress will attempt to influence their fellow legislators is with oversight. Hence there is a personal incentive for members of Congress to conduct in oversight activities as they attempt to protect and add to their political powerbase (Lindsay, 1990).

D. HOW CONGRESS CONTROLS DEFENSE SPENDING

There are a very direct methods Congress will use for implementing control measures and oversight for the defense budget. “Strong incentives are present for Congress to actively micromanage defense policy and budgets, and congressional rules and procedures provide many means by which to control the DoD through authorization, appropriation, and oversight” (Candrea & Jones, 2005, p. 3–4). Candrea and Jones assert that Congress uses the following methods to control the DoD: line item budgeting, earmarked funds, reprogramming and transfer restrictions, restricting access to funds pending compliance, formal and informal information gathering, reviews/audits/investigations, structural requirements placed on programs, and reporting requirements (2005, 105–122). The methods Congress uses to directly control defense spending that this paper will discuss are a combination of line item budgeting, formal and informal information collection coupled with governing laws and regulations.

1. Line Item Budgeting

One of the most direct ways Congress can dictate the details of the defense budget is from line item budgeting. The executive branch’s defense budget requests the levels of category and program funding. With line item budgeting, Congress can take categories of requested defense spending breaking it down into individual programs for a line-by-line program funding level. Congress can increase, decrease, or leave the spending levels at requested budgetary levels, a powerful control measure. Programs can have no funding appropriated essentially killing the program, increased or decreased funding levels providing more or less spending in certain congressional districts. Line item control enables Congress to directly impact the President’s requests with a program-by-program

review and modification if Congress deems necessary, however, this has led to an increase in congressional control as “well over 60% of Pentagon line item requests are changed by each chamber” (Art, 1985, p. 228).

2. Formal and Informal Information Collecting

The HASC and SASC will conduct formal information gathering and analysis from hearings, documentation, audits, accounting requirements, reports, and investigations. Informal information will be collected from DoD staff, government officials, and defense industry experts. The information gained from formal and informal sources is a key to the methods of congressional oversight implemented (Candrea & Jones, 2005). The information gained comes at a price in time and dollars as both subcommittees (HASC and SASC) functions overlap heavily but remain uncoordinated in their actions (Candrea & Jones, 2005). Information is used for line item budgeting, but the number of restrictions, conditions, and directions Congress requires of the DoD has been increasing to satisfy Congress’ control measures as defense spending levels increased (Mayer, 1993). The amount of information required by Congress from formal methods justifies the defense budgetary levels while providing proof of compliance with congressional control requirements. Additionally, Congress has to update, add, or remove laws and regulations for the DoD (Mayer, 1993).

Another factor for increased control is the amount of dollars contractually obligated at increasing levels for DoD programs. With individual programmed items potentially costing billions and entire programs costing hundreds of billions of dollars, Congress wants to govern and regulate the relationship between DoD and the defense industrial base to include contractual procurement. All of this congressional control gives the HASC and SASC more information but adds to the lengthy defense budgetary process. Lindsay argues that

Congressional oversight of the DoD can be subdivided into three distinct types: fiscal (if the administration’s request for individual programs should be changed), management (spending money efficiently), and policy (whether programs accomplish their designated missions and if they make sense) (Lindsay, 1990, p. 10).

Chapter II looked at the methods of congressional power controls the defense budget, including the congressional budget process, why Congress controls defense spending, and the means Congress control utilizes. Chapter III will present and analyze data determining if the trends and assertions observed by Jones and Bixler remained valid beyond their period of study. Chapter III will compare the levels of congressional control of defense budgets during the Cold War, a relative period of peace (post-Cold War to 9/11), and a period of war (post 9/11 to 2011).

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III. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

Chapter II described some of the measures Congress utilizes to control defense through the budget process. Chapter III will present assertions by Jones and Bixler regarding congressional control of defense during the Cold War era. The data was extended, organized, presented, and analyzed comparing the Cold War to the relative period of peace (1992–2001) to the period of war (2001–2011). The analysis will have one of three results for each assertion by Jones and Bixler regarding each respective time period and the overall trend. The results for their assertions are: remains valid (data supports their assertion), invalid (data does not support), or declare neutral (data is inconclusive).

Each analysis will include a linear regression on the data series covering the Cold War era, relative period of peace, period of war, the entire data series, and the last 20 years. The figures included with each analysis include a trend line based on the regression analysis to graphically represent the overall trend during each time period.

Jones and Bixler's assertions fall into three general categories: legislative, oversight, and capacity.

Legislative

- Number of pages in Defense Authorization Bills
- Number of pages in Defense Appropriation Bills
- Number of pages in HASC Defense Authorization Reports
- Number of pages in SASC Defense Authorization Reports
- Number of pages in HAC Defense Appropriation Reports
- Number of pages in SAC Defense Appropriation Reports
- Number of General Provisions

Oversight

- Number of HASC/SASC Hearings

- Number of witnesses before the HASC/SASC

Capacity

- Number of congressional staff members

A. NUMBER OF PAGES IN DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILLS

1. Assertion

Jones and Bixler (1992) found a trend in increased use of statutory controls by Congress to control the DoD budget. "These data document a steady increase in the number of pages in defense authorization and appropriation legislation in the period 1963–1991" (p. 49). The increase in the number of pages in defense authorization bills is likely from greater specificity in the annual DoD authorization bills complex language and an increase in the line-item subdivisions.

2. Data Organization

The data in Table 2 was adapted from Jones and Bixler's (1992) Table 4.1 (p. 49) and extended through FY 2011. The data for the number of pages in the authorization bills for FY 1994–2011 was determined by referencing the respective bills on the United States Government Printing Office website (<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys>), opening the Adobe Acrobat copy of the actual bill signed into public law, and noting the page count. The page numbers for the FY 1992 and 1993 defense authorization bills were determined by referencing the respective public law in the United States Statutes at Large publication and counting the actual pages. To ensure consistency of data collection, the Jones and Bixler (1992) page counts for 1963–1969 were verified using the same methodology.

3. Data Presentation

Table 2 shows the number of pages in the defense authorization bills for the years 1963–2011. Figure 1 displays the defense authorization bills data broken down into three separate data series with associated trend lines. The first data series (blue boxes) represents Jones and Bixler's Cold War era data, the second (green boxes) represents a relative period of peace, and the third (red boxes) represents a period of war.

Table 2. Number of Pages in Defense Authorization Bills (FY 1963–2011) (After: Jones & Bixler, 1992, FY 1963–1991; National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), FY 1992–1993; NDAA, FY 1994–2011)

Cold War Era		Relative Period of Peace		Period of War	
FY	Auth. Bills	FY	Auth. Bills	FY	Auth. Bills
1963	1	1992	299	2002	384
1964	2	1993	456	2003	305
1965	1	1994	421	2004	436
1966	3	1995	454	2005	389
1967	5	1996	519	2006	423
1968	3	1997	449	2007	439
1969	4	1998	450	2008	602
1970	10	1999	360	2009	888
1971	10	2000	466	2010	656
1972	9	2001	515	2011	637
1973	7				
1974	19				
1975	11				
1976	16				
1977	15				
1978	17				
1979	19				
1980	19				
1981	47				
1982	36				
1983	46				
1984	95				
1985	170				
1986	197				
1987	265				
1988	230				
1989	285				
1990	339				
1991	371				

	Cold War Era	Relative Period of Peace	Period of War
Mean	77.66	438.9	525.64
Median	17	452	439
R-Squared	0.67	0.20	0.60
Std Deviation	114.45	66.50	170.15
Trendline Slope	10.97	9.86	46.36

Trendline Slope (1963–2011)	14.97
Trendline Slope (1992–2011)	12.76




Figure 1. Number of Pages in Defense Authorization Bills (1963–2011)

4. Data Analysis

Jones and Bixler found the number of pages in the defense authorization bills increased throughout the Cold War. Expanding the data set looking across the entire 1963 to 2011 period, there was an overall increase in those 50 years. However, for the relative period of peace, the total number of pages rate of increase slowed and for the period of war, the rate significantly increased. Jones and Bixler’s assertion remains valid across the full 50-year period and remains valid when looking at the last 20 years (relative period of peace and period of war).

The number of pages in the defense authorization bills for the Cold War increased at a rate of 10.97 pages per year while the relative period of peace increased at a slightly slower rate of 9.86 pages per year supporting Jones and Bixler’s assertion. For the period of war the number of pages in defense authorization bills significantly increased at a rate of 46.36 pages per year (323% increase from Cold War levels) supporting Jones and Bixler’s assertion. The last 20 years increased at 12.76 pages per year supporting Jones and Bixler’s assertion. The overall historical trend (FY 1963–2011) increased at 14.97

pages per year as Jones and Bixler's assertion remains valid regarding Congress' increase in the amount of control exerted over the DoD with the number of pages in defense authorization bills.

B. NUMBER OF PAGES IN DEFENSE APPROPRIATION BILLS

1. Assertion

Just as Jones and Bixler asserted that the number of pages in the authorization bills is an indicator of the increased utilization of statutory controls by Congress to control DoD through the budget process, they make the same assertions regarding the number of pages in defense appropriation bills.

2. Data Organization

The data in Table 3 was adapted from Jones and Bixler's (1992) Table 4.1 (p. 49) and extended through FY 2011. The data for the number of pages in the defense appropriation bills for FY 1996–2011 was determined by referencing the respective bills on the United States Government Printing Office website (<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys>), opening the PDF copy of the actual bill signed into public law, and noting the page count. The page numbers for the FY 1992–1995 defense appropriation bills were determined by referencing the respective public law in the United States Statutes at Large publication and counting the actual pages. To ensure consistency of data collection, the Jones and Bixler (1992) page counts for 1963–1969 were verified using the same methodology.

3. Data Presentation

Table 3 shows the number of pages in the defense appropriation bills for the years 1963–2011. Figure 2 displays the defense appropriation bills data broken down into three separate data series with associated trend lines. The first data series (blue boxes) represents Jones and Bixler's Cold War era data, the second (green boxes) represents a relative period of peace, and the third (red boxes) represents a period of war.

4. Data Analysis

Jones and Bixler found the number of pages in the defense appropriation bills increased throughout the Cold War. Expanding the data set looking across the entire 1963 to 2011 period, there was an overall increase. However, for the relative period of peace the total number of pages decreased and for the period of war the rate of decrease stopped and the total number of pages plateaued. Jones and Bixler's assertion remains valid across the full 50-year period but it is neutral when looking at the last 20 years.

The number of pages in the defense appropriation bills for the Cold War increased at a rate of 1.73 pages per year. The rate of growth for the relative period of peace declined slightly at 0.62 pages per year not supporting Jones and Bixler's assertion. The period of war rate is essentially flat (negative 0.04 pages per year) not supporting Jones and Bixler's assertion (neutral) due to the insignificant effect it had considering the volume of pages in defense appropriation bills. The assertion of a growing trend no longer holds (negative 0.35 pages per year) in the 20 year period since Jones and Bixler's study. The overall historical trend (FY 1963–2011) marginally increased at 1.25 pages per year, as Jones and Bixler's assertion remains valid regarding Congress' increase in the amount of control exerted over the DoD with the number of pages in defense appropriation bills.

Table 3. Number of Pages in Defense Appropriation Bills (FY 1963–2011) (After: Jones & Bixler, 1992, FY 1963–1991; DoD Appropriations Act, FY 1992–1995; DoD Appropriations Act, FY 1996–2011)

Cold War Era Appropriation		Relative Period of Peace Appropriation		Period of War Appropriation	
FY	Bills	FY	Bills	FY	Bills
1963	18	1992	67	2002	62
1964	17	1993	72	2003	59
1965	17	1994	67	2004	57
1966	18	1995	61	2005	65
1967	19	1996	47	2006	74
1968	19	1997	89	2007	60
1969	18	1998	49	2008	50
1970	19	1999	64	2009	49
1971	19	2000	74	2010	67
1972	20	2001	55	2011	66
1973	21				
1974	21				
1975	22				
1976	27				
1977	23				
1978	26				
1979	25				
1980	27				
1981	28				
1982	30				
1983	34				
1984	39				
1985	68				
1986	40				
1987	98				
1988	47				
1989	61				
1990	47				
1991	59				

	Cold War Era	Relative Period of Peace	Period of War
Mean	31.97	64.5	60.9
Median	25	65.5	61
R-Squared	0.60	0.02	0.0003
Std Deviation	19.11	12.51	7.69
Trendline Slope	1.73	-0.62	-0.04

Trendline Slope (1963–2011)	1.25
Trendline Slope (1992–2011)	-0.35




Figure 2. Number of Pages in Defense Appropriation Bills (1963–2011)

C. NUMBER OF PAGES IN HASC DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REPORT

1. Assertion

Jones and Bixler (1992) assert the data they collected during the Cold War era, specifically the number of pages in HASC defense authorization committee reports, reveal a trend in increased use of nonstatutory budget controls by Congress to control the DoD budget.

Nonstatutory budget controls are applied more frequently than statutory budget controls because they do not require the consent of Congress. As such, these controls appear to be more prone to use by members of Congressional committees seeking to support personal and constituent interests. (p. 56).

According to Jones and Bixler (1992), "A review of trends in committee reports indicates an evolution from rather mundane, nondescriptive documents to specific guidelines for control" resulting in a "trend toward increased complexity and length of reports" (p. 62). Art (1985, p. 233) substantiated this assertion based on an evaluation of the defense authorization and appropriation committee reports from 1960 through 1984.

According to Jones and Bixler (1992), the increase in defense authorization committee report size is likely due to an increase in the number of titles within the authorization bills and an increase in the number of individual line items contained within each title (p. 63).

2. Data Organization

The data in Table 4 was adapted from Jones and Bixler's (1992) Table 4.5 (p. 64) and extended through FY 2011. The data for the number of pages in the HASC defense authorization committee report for FY 1992–2011 was determined by referencing the respective report on the United States Government Printing Office website (<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys>), opening the Adobe Acrobat copy of the actual report, and noting the page count. To ensure consistency of data collection, the Jones and Bixler (1992) data for 1987–1991 were verified using the same methodology.

3. Data Presentation

Table 4 shows the number of pages in the HASC defense authorization committee reports for the years 1965–2011. Figure 3 displays the HASC defense authorization data broken down into three separate data series with associated trend lines. The first data series (blue boxes) represents Jones and Bixler's Cold War era data, the second (green boxes) represents a relative period of peace, and the third (red boxes) represents a period of war.

Table 4. Number of Pages in HASC Defense Authorization Report (FY 1965–2011) (After: Jones & Bixler, 1992, FY 1965–1991; HASC, FY 1992–2011)

Cold War Era		Relative Period of Peace		Period of War	
FY	HASC Report	FY	HASC Report	FY	HASC Report
1965	63	1992	513	2002	740
1969	91	1993	494	2003	612
1970	176	1994	744	2004	552
1971	95	1995	579	2005	938
1972	107	1996	660	2006	552
1973	115	1997	725	2007	712
1974	132	1998	803	2008	670
1975	132	1999	580	2009	683
1976	185	2000	730	2010	708
1977	169	2001	476	2011	637
1978	150				
1979	163				
1980	186				
1981	171				
1982	228				
1983	233				
1984	332				
1985	399				
1986	431				
1987	272				
1988	399				
1989	486				
1990	549				
1991	670				

	Cold War Era	Relative Period of Peace	Period of War
Mean	247.25	630.40	680.40
Median	180.5	620	676.5
R-Squared	0.77	0.04	0.002
Std Deviation	161.71	117.31	111.22
Trendline Slope	19.46	7.49	-1.48

Trendline Slope (1965–2011)	16.61
Trendline Slope (1992–2011)	3.33




Figure 3. Number of Pages in HASC Defense Authorization Report (1965–2011)

4. Data Analysis

Jones and Bixler found the number of pages in the HASC defense authorization committee reports increased throughout the Cold War. Expanding the data set looking across the entire 1965 to 2011 period, there was an overall increase in those 50 years. However, for the relative period of peace the rate of increase slowed and for the period of war the number of pages plateaued with a slight decreasing rate. Jones and Bixler’s assertion remains valid across the full 50-year period and remains valid when looking at the last 20 years.

The number of pages in the HASC defense authorization committee reports for the Cold War increased at a rate of 19.46 pages per year, but the relative period of peace rate of increase slowed to 7.49 pages per year supporting Jones and Bixler’s assertion. For the period of war the rate of increase stopped and plateaued with a slightly decreasing rate of 1.48 pages per year. The reduction is insignificant considering the volume of the HASC defense authorization committee reports and did not support Jones and Bixler’s assertion (neutral). The last 20 years increased at 3.33 pages per year supporting Jones and Bixler’s assertion. The overall historical trend (FY 1965–2011) increased at 16.61

pages per year as Jones and Bixler's assertion remains valid regarding Congress' increase in the amount of control exerted over the DoD with the number of pages in HASC defense authorization committee reports.

D. NUMBER OF PAGES IN SASC DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REPORT

1. Assertion

Just as Jones and Bixler asserted that the number of pages in the HASC defense authorization committee report is indicative of the increased use of nonstatutory controls by Congress to control DoD through the budget process, they make the same assertions regarding the number of pages in SASC defense authorization committee reports.

2. Data Organization

The data in Table 5 was adapted from Jones and Bixler's (1992) Table 4.5 (p. 64) and extended through FY 2011. The data for the number of pages in the SASC defense authorization committee report for FY 1992–2011 was determined by referencing the respective report on the United States Government Printing Office website (<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys>), opening the Adobe Acrobat copy of the actual report, and noting the page count. To ensure consistency of data collection, the Jones and Bixler (1992) data for 1987–1991 were verified using the same methodology.

3. Data Presentation

Table 5 shows the number of pages in the SASC defense authorization committee reports for the years 1965–2011. Figure 4 displays the SASC defense authorization committee data broken down into three separate data series with associated trend lines. The first data series (blue boxes) represents Jones and Bixler's Cold War era data, the second (green boxes) represents a relative period of peace, and the third (red boxes) represents a period of war.

Table 5. Number of Pages in SASC Defense Authorization Report (FY 1965–2011)
(After: Jones & Bixler, 1992, FY 1965–1991; SASC, FY 1992–2011)

Cold War Era		Relative Period of Peace		Period of War	
FY	SASC Report	FY	SASC Report	FY	SASC Report
1965	17	1992	429	2002	480
1969	31	1993	416	2003	499
1970	70	1994	341	2004	488
1971	121	1995	323	2005	512
1972	140	1996	422	2006	514
1973	177	1997	455	2007	551
1974	205	1998	490	2008	673
1975	190	1999	477	2009	584
1976	191	2000	489	2010	350
1977	204	2001	473	2011	373
1978	153				
1979	158				
1980	166				
1981	242				
1982	197				
1983	222				
1984	432				
1985	489				
1986	309				
1987	296				
1988	228				
1989	194				
1990	297				
1991	373				

	Cold War Era	Relative Period of Peace	Period of War
Mean	212.58	431.50	502.40
Median	195.5	442	505.5
R-Squared	0.58	0.43	0.04
Standard Deviation	112.62	59.04	93.71
Trendline Slope	11.79	12.85	-6.10

Trendline Slope (1965–2011)	10.39
Trendline Slope (1992–2011)	6.17




Figure 4. Number of Pages in SASC Defense Authorization Report (1965–2011)

4. Data Analysis

Jones and Bixler found the number of pages in the SASC defense authorization committee reports increased throughout the Cold War. Expanding the data set looking across the entire 1965 to 2011 period, there was an overall increase in those 50 years. However, for the relative period of peace the number of pages rate of increase accelerated slightly and for the period of war the rate of increase stopped, reversed, and had a decreasing rate. Jones and Bixler’s assertion remains valid across the full 50-year period and remains valid when looking at the last 20 years.

The number of pages in the SASC defense authorization committee reports for the Cold War increased at a rate of 11.79 pages per year. The relative period of peace increased at a slightly greater rate of 12.85 pages per year supporting Jones and Bixler’s assertion. The period of war has a decreasing rate of 6.10 pages per year not supporting Jones and Bixler’s assertion. Of note, the period of war experienced a slower rate of increase until FY 2010–2011 as suddenly the number of pages significantly decreased by over 200 pages per report. Although there is not enough data to state conclusively that this is a new trend, it could be either a point of inflection or just two outliers. The last 20

years increased at 6.17 pages per year supporting Jones and Bixler's assertion. The overall historical trend (FY 1965–2011) increased at 10.39 pages per year as Jones and Bixler's assertion remains valid regarding Congress' increase in the amount of control exerted over the DoD with the number of pages in the SASC defense authorization committee reports.

E. NUMBER OF PAGES IN HAC DEFENSE APPROPRIATION REPORT

1. Assertion

Where we saw that the number of pages in HASC and SASC defense authorization committee reports were indicative of the increased use of nonstatutory controls by Congress to control DoD through the budget process, our attention now turns to the number of pages in the HAC and SAC defense appropriation committee reports.

2. Data Organization

The data in Table 6 was adapted from Jones and Bixler's (1992) Table 4.6 (p. 65) and extended through FY 2011. The data for the number of pages in the HAC defense appropriation committee report for FY 1992–2011 was determined by referencing the respective report on the United States Government Printing Office website (<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys>), opening the Adobe Acrobat copy of the actual report, and noting the page count. To ensure consistency of data collection, the Jones and Bixler (1992) data for 1987–1991 were verified using the same methodology.

3. Data Presentation

Table 6 shows the number of pages in the HAC defense appropriation committee reports for the years 1960–2011. Figure 5 displays the HAC defense appropriation committee report data broken down into three separate data series with associated trend lines. The first data series (blue boxes) represents Jones and Bixler's Cold War era data, the second (green boxes) represents a relative period of peace, and the third (red boxes) represents a period of war.

Table 6. Number of Pages in HAC Defense Appropriation Report (FY 1960–2011)
(After: Jones & Bixler, 1992, FY 1960–1991; HAC, FY 1992–2011)

Cold War Era		Relative Period of Peace		Period of War	
FY	HAC Report	FY	HAC Report	FY	HAC Report
1960	83	1992	269	2002	379
1961	74	1993	255	2003	382
1964	70	1994	330	2004	341
1965	51	1995	305	2005	427
1968	67	1996	217	2006	367
1969	68	1997	243	2007	351
1970	102	1998	292	2008	493
1971	119	1999	315	2009	570
1972	139	2000	331	2010	476
1973	256	2001	237	2011	637
1974	239				
1975	171				
1976	358				
1977	226				
1978	387				
1979	446				
1980	493				
1981	398				
1982	315				
1983	259				
1984	298				
1985	299				
1986	401				
1987	324				
1988	307				
1989	223				
1990	251				
1991	273				

	Cold War Era	Relative Period of Peace	Period of War
Mean	239.18	279.40	442.3
Median	253.5	280.5	404.5
R-Squared	0.49	0.005	0.624
Standard Deviation	128.26	40.9	100.04
Trendline Slope	10.03	0.95	26.10

Trendline Slope (1960–2011)	6.82
Trendline Slope (1992–2011)	15.60




Figure 5. Number of Pages in HAC Defense Appropriation Report (1960–2011)

4. Data Analysis

Jones and Bixler found the number of pages in the HAC defense appropriation committee reports increased throughout the Cold War. Expanding the data set looking across the entire 1960 to 2011 period, there was an overall increase. However, for the relative period of peace the rate of increase stopped and the number of pages has plateaued and for the period of war the rate of increase resumed rising significantly. Jones and Bixler's assertion remains valid across the full 50-year period and remains valid when looking at the last 20 years.

The number of pages in the HAC defense appropriation committee reports for the Cold War increased at a rate of 10.03 pages per year. The relative period of peace plateaus at a marginally increasing rate of 0.95 pages per year not supporting Jones and Bixler's assertion. The marginal increase is insignificant considering the volume of the HAC defense appropriation committee reports not supporting Jones and Bixler's assertion (neutral). The period of war has a significantly increasing rate of 26.10 pages per year (surpassing the Cold War rate of growth) supporting Jones and Bixler's assertion. The last 20 years increased at 15.60 pages per year supporting Jones and

Bixler's assertion. The overall historical trend (FY 1960–2011) increased at 6.82 pages per year as Jones and Bixler's assertion remains valid regarding Congress' increase in the amount of control exerted over the DoD with the number of pages in the HAC defense appropriation committee reports.

F. NUMBER OF PAGES IN SAC DEFENSE APPROPRIATION REPORT

1. Assertion

Just as Jones and Bixler asserted that the number of pages in the HAC defense appropriation committee report is indicative of the increased utilization of nonstatutory controls by Congress to control the DoD budget, they make the same assertions regarding the number of pages in SAC defense appropriation committee reports.

2. Data Organization

The data in Table 7 was adapted from Jones and Bixler's (1992) Table 4.6 (p. 65) and extended through FY 2011. The data for the number of pages in the SAC defense appropriation committee report for FY 1992–2011 was determined by referencing the respective report on the United States Government Printing Office website (<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys>), opening the Adobe Acrobat copy of the actual report, and noting the page count. To ensure consistency of data collection, the Jones and Bixler (1992) data for 1987–1991 were verified using the same methodology.

3. Data Presentation

Table 7 shows the number of pages in the SAC defense appropriation committee reports for the years 1960–2011. Figure 6 displays the SAC defense appropriation committee reports data broken down into three separate data series with associated trend lines. The first data series (blue boxes) represents Jones and Bixler's Cold War era data, the second (green boxes) represents a relative period of peace, and the third (red boxes) represents a period of war.

Table 7. Number of Pages in SAC Defense Appropriation Report (FY 1960–2011)
(After: Jones & Bixler, 1992, FY 1960–1991; SAC, FY 1992–2011)

Cold War Era		Relative Period of Peace		Period of War	
FY	SAC Report	FY	SAC Report	FY	SAC Report
1960	31	1992	391	2002	234
1961	47	1993	357	2003	244
1964	69	1994	403	2004	196
1965	52	1995	385	2005	213
1968	71	1996	221	2006	274
1969	56	1997	165	2007	253
1970	141	1998	159	2008	298
1971	221	1999	163	2009	466
1972	210	2000	151	2010	304
1973	204	2001	160	2011	271
1974	173				
1975	207				
1976	302				
1977	277				
1978	295				
1979	217				
1980	219				
1981	227				
1982	137				
1983	157				
1984	205				
1985	227				
1986	363				
1987	373				
1988	353				
1989	311				
1990	343				
1991	274				

	Cold War Era	Relative Period of Peace	Period of War
Mean	205.79	255.50	275.30
Median	213.5	193	262
R-Squared	0.68	0.79	0.324
Standard Deviation	102.52	112.78	75.33
Trendline Slope	9.44	-33.06	14.16

Trendline Slope (1960–2011)	3.76
Trendline Slope (1992–2011)	-0.86




Figure 6. Number of Pages in SAC Defense Appropriation Report (1960–2011)

4. Data Analysis

Jones and Bixler found the number of pages in the SAC defense appropriation committee reports increased throughout the Cold War. Expanding the data set looking across the entire 1960 to 2011 period, there was an overall increase. However, at the start of the relative period of peace there was a point of inflection and the number of pages significantly decreased. At the start of the period of war there was another inflection point, reversing the downward trend. Jones and Bixler’s assertion remains valid across the full 50-year period and is neutral when looking at the last 20 years.

The number of pages in the SAC defense appropriation committee reports for the Cold War increased at a rate of 9.44 pages per year. In the relative period of peace during FY 1996–1997 there was a point of inflection (200 page reduction) resulting in a significantly decreasing rate of 33.06 pages per year not supporting Jones and Bixler’s assertion. The period of war reversed the negative trend with a positive rate of increase (at an accelerated rate of increase compared to the Cold War) of 14.16 pages per year supporting Jones and Bixler’s assertion. The last 20 years was neutral (negative 0.86 pages per year) not supporting Jones and Bixler’s assertion. The overall historical trend

(FY 1960–2011) increased at 3.76 pages per year as Jones and Bixler’s assertion remains valid regarding Congress’ increase in the amount of control exerted over the DoD with the number of pages in the SAC defense appropriation committee reports.

G. NUMBER OF HASC AND SASC HEARINGS

1. Assertion

Jones and Bixler (1992) assert the data they collected during the Cold War era, specifically the number of HASC and SASC hearings, indicate a trend in increased use of other forms of control (information gathering via hearings) by Congress to control the DoD budget (p. 71).

Jones and Bixler also assert that the increase in the number of hearings can be explained by the expansion of the annual authorization process to cover more of the DoD budget and the propensity for individual members of the HASC and SASC to request more extensive testimony by "outside experts, witnesses, and consultants" (p. 72).

2. Data Organization

The data in Tables 8 and 9 was adapted from Jones and Bixler’s (1992) Table 4.8 (p. 72) and extended through FY 2011. The data for the total number of HASC hearings and full committee hearings for FY 1997–2011 were derived from hearing schedules on the HASC website (<http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings>). The data for the total number of SASC hearings and full committee hearings for FY 1999–2010 were derived from SASC hearing schedules on the SASC website (<http://armedservices.senate.gov/hearings.cfm>). Delineation between full committee hearings and total hearings was determined by opening up each individual hearing webpage, reading the hearing summary, and noting whether the full committee or a subcommittee met. There are holes in the data collected spread among the three periods of study as the authors could not locate the missing data points in the time available for the thesis.

3. Data Presentation

Tables 8 and 9 show the total number of HASC and SASC hearings and total number of full committee hearings for fiscal years 1966–1972 and 1997–2011 respectively. Figures 7 through 10 displays the HASC and SASC total hearings and full committee hearings data broken down into three separate data series with associated trend lines. The first data series (blue boxes) represents Jones and Bixler's Cold War era data, the second (green boxes) represents a relative period of peace, and the third (red boxes) represents a period of war.

Table 8. Number of HASC and SASC Hearings (FY 1966–1972, 1997–2011)
(After: Jones & Bixler, 1992, FY 1966–1972; HASC Hearing Schedule, FY 1997–2011; SASC Hearing Schedule, FY 1997–2011)

HASC and SASC Total Hearings								
Cold War Era			Relative Period of Peace			Period of War		
FY	HASC	SASC	FY	HASC	SASC	FY	HASC	SASC
1966	17	24	1997	69		2002	64	56
1967	17	20	1998	61		2003	65	57
1968	11	15	1999	77	78	2004		54
1969	26	18	2000	57	59	2005		50
1970	26	17	2001	52	66	2006		53
1971	30	20				2007	108	63
1972	30	19				2008	67	56
						2009	101	57
						2010	63	54
						2011	100	

	Cold War Era		Relative Period of Peace		Period of War	
	HASC	SASC	HASC	SASC	HASC	SASC
Mean	22.43	19.00	63.20	67.67	81.14	55.56
Median	26	19	61	66	67	56
R-Squared	0.69	0.13	0.37	0.39	0.21	0.01
Standard Deviation	7.41	2.83	9.91	9.61	20.64	3.57
Trendline Slope	2.86	-0.46	-3.80	-6.00	2.78	0.15

	HASC	SASC
Trendline Slope (1966–2011)	1.51	1.05
Trendline Slope (1997–2011)	2.13	-1.16

Table 9. Number of HASC/SASC Full Committee Hearings (FY 1966–72, 1997–2011) (After: Jones & Bixler, 1992, FY 1966–1972; HASC Hearing Schedule, FY 1997–2011; SASC Hearing Schedule, FY 1997–2011)

HASC and SASC Full Committee Hearings								
Cold War Era			Relative Period of Peace			Period of War		
FY	HASC	SASC	FY	HASC	SASC	FY	HASC	SASC
1966	6	12	1997	17		2002	19	26
1967	5	12	1998	15		2003	26	33
1968	1	8	1999	24	40	2004		29
1969	2	15	2000	16	35	2005		33
1970	6	9	2001	13	38	2006		32
1971	10	14				2007	46	43
1972	5	8				2008	23	38
						2009	35	40
						2010	23	39
						2011	47	

	Cold War Era		Relative Period of Peace		Period of War	
	HASC	SASC	HASC	SASC	HASC	SASC
Mean	5.00	11.14	17.00	37.67	31.29	34.78
Median	5	12	16	38	26	33
R-Squared	0.10	0.04	0.07	0.16	0.25	0.69
Standard Deviation	2.94	2.85	4.18	2.52	11.50	5.56
Trendline Slope	0.43	-0.25	-0.70	-1.00	1.69	1.68

	HASC	SASC
Trendline Slope (1966–2011)	0.64	0.67
Trendline Slope (1997–2011)	1.65	0.42




Figure 7. Total Number of HASC Hearings (1966–72, 1997–2011)




Figure 8. Total Number of HASC Full Committee Hearings (1966–72, 1997–2011)




Figure 9. Total Number of SASC Hearings (1966–72, 1997–2011)




Figure 10. Total Number of SASC Full Committee Hearings (1966–72, 1997–2011)

4. Data Analysis

Jones and Bixler found the number of HASC and SASC hearings increased throughout the Cold War. If the data set is extrapolated and expanded looking across the

entire 1966 to 2011 period, (with limited data points) there was an overall increase in the number of hearings. However, the number of HASC and SASC hearings during the relative period of peace had a declining trend and for the period of war there was an increasing data trend. For the HASC, Jones and Bixler's assertion remains valid as the number is greater today than it was during their period of study. For the SASC, Jones and Bixler's assertion remains valid, as the number is greater today than it was during their period of study. The data analysis will be technically inconclusive regarding Jones and Bixler's assertion from too few data points; however, a limited data analysis will be presented.

The number of HASC hearings for the Cold War increased at a rate of 2.86 hearings per year. The number of HASC hearings for the relative period of peace decreased at a rate of 3.80 hearings per year as the limited data does not support Jones and Bixler's assertion. The number of HASC hearings for the period of war increased at a rate of 2.78 hearings per year as the limited data supports Jones and Bixler's assertion. The last 20 years increased at 2.13 hearings per year supporting Jones and Bixler's assertion. The overall limited historical data (FY 1966–2011) increased at 1.51 hearings per year. With limited data points, Jones and Bixler's assertion remains valid (limited data supported) of Congress's increase in the amount of control exerted over the DoD with the number of HASC hearings.

The number of SASC hearings for the Cold War slightly decreased at a rate of 0.46 hearings per year. The number of SASC hearings for the relative period of peace decreased at a rate of 6.00 hearings per year as the limited data does not support Jones and Bixler's assertion. The number of SASC hearings for the period of war plateaued (neutral) at a rate of 0.15 hearings per year. The limited data does not support Jones and Bixler's assertion. The last 20 years decreased at 1.16 pages per year invalidating Jones and Bixler's assertion. The overall limited data (FY 1966–2011) increased at 1.05 hearings per year. With limited data points, Jones and Bixler's assertion remains valid (limited data supported) regarding Congress' increase in the amount of control exerted over the DoD with the number of SASC hearings.

H. NUMBER OF WITNESSES BEFORE THE HASC AND SASC

1. Assertion

Jones and Bixler (1992) assert the data they collected during the Cold War era, specifically the number of witnesses brought before the HASC and SASC, reveal a trend in increased use of other forms of congressional budget controls by Congress to control the DoD budget.

According to Jones and Bixler (1992), the increase in the number of witnesses before the HASC and SASC between 1965 and 1984 is directly related to the increase in the number of defense related hearings (p. 77). Jones and Bixler also assert that the increase in the number of hearings can be explained by the expansion of the annual authorization process to cover more of the DoD budget and the propensity for individual members of the HASC and SASC to request more extensive testimony by "outside experts, witnesses, and consultants" (p. 72).

Additionally, Jones and Bixler state that "another indicator of the new congressional propensity for delving into the specifics of the defense budget is the change in the quality or content value of the questions asked of defense witnesses by committee members and their staff" (p. 76).

2. Data Organization

The data in Table 10 was adapted from Jones and Bixler's (1992) Table 4.9 (p. 75) and extended through FY 2011. The data for the number of witnesses before the HASC for FY 1997–2011 was determined by reviewing the hearing schedules on the HASC website (<http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings>), opening up the individual hearing webpage, referencing the witness list, and categorizing the witnesses into three categories (DoD, Other Government, and Non-Government). The data for the number of witnesses before the SASC for FY 1997–2011 was determined by reviewing the hearing schedules on the SASC website (<http://armed-services.senate.gov/hearings.cfm>), opening up the individual hearing webpage, referencing the witness list, and categorizing the

witnesses into the same three categories. There are holes in the data collected spread among the three periods of study as the authors could not locate the missing data points in the time available for the thesis.

3. Data Presentation

Table 10 shows the number of witnesses before the HASC and SASC for Fiscal Years 1966–1972 and 1997–2011. The first data series (blue text) represents Jones and Bixler's Cold War era data, the second (green text) represents a relative period of peace, and the third (red text) represents a period of war.

4. Data Analysis

Jones and Bixler found the number of witnesses before the HASC and SASC increased throughout the Cold War. If the data set is extrapolated and expanded looking across the entire 1966 to 2011 period, (with limited data points) there was an overall neutral effect in those 50 years. However, for the HASC and SASC, the number of witnesses during the relative period of peace has a declining trend and for the period of war there is an increasing trend. Jones and Bixler's assertion is neutral across the full 50-year period and invalid when looking at the last 20 years. The data analysis will be technically inconclusive regarding Jones and Bixler's assertion from too few data points, however, a limited data analysis will be presented.

The number of witnesses before the HASC and SASC for the Cold War increased at a rate of 16.46 witnesses per year. The relative period of peace decreased at a rate of 18.20 witnesses per year as the limited data does not support Jones and Bixler's assertion. The period of war has a slightly increasing rate of 3.35 witnesses per year as the limited data supports Jones and Bixler's assertion. Of note are the different categories of witnesses and to what extent Congress utilized their expertise. In all but three years, DoD witnesses comprised over 50% and in four years they were over 70% of the total number of witnesses before the HASC and SASC. For the three time periods, the percentage of DoD witnesses has effectively plateaued (60%), other government witnesses have decreased (from 21% to 11%), and the non-government witnesses have increased (16% to 29%). The last 20 years decreased at 5.32 witnesses per year invalidating Jones and

Bixler's assertion. The overall historical trend (FY 1966–1972, 1997–2011) is slightly decreasing at 0.67 witnesses per year (limited data points) but Jones and Bixler's assertion is neutral (limited data supported) regarding Congress' increase in the amount of control exerted over the DoD with the number of witnesses before the HASC and SASC.

Table 10. Number of HASC and SASC Witnesses (FY 1966–1972, 1997–2011)
(After: Jones & Bixler, 1992, FY 1966–1972; HASC Hearing Schedule, FY 1997–2011; SASC Hearing Schedule, FY 1997–2011)

	FY	DoD	DoD % Yearly Total	Other Govt	Other Govt % Yearly Total	Non-Govt Non-Govt	Non-Govt % Yearly Total	Yearly Total
Cold War Era	1966	155	51.67%	106	35.33%	39	13.00%	300
	1967	187	55.49%	68	20.18%	82	24.33%	337
	1968	134	81.71%	17	10.37%	13	7.93%	164
	1969	148	68.84%	47	21.86%	20	9.30%	215
	1970	201	61.85%	67	20.62%	57	17.54%	325
	1971	222	47.64%	89	19.10%	155	33.26%	466
	1972	233	74.20%	58	18.47%	23	7.32%	314
Period of Relative Peace	1997	207	57.98%	73	20.45%	77	21.57%	357
	1998	178	63.35%	43	15.30%	60	21.35%	281
	1999	291	67.52%	57	13.23%	83	19.26%	431
	2000	166	61.25%	40	14.76%	65	23.99%	271
	2001	166	61.25%	40	14.76%	65	23.99%	271
Period of War	2002	133	48.01%	28	10.11%	116	41.88%	277
	2003	157	72.02%	21	9.63%	40	18.35%	218
	2007	175	62.06%	41	14.54%	66	23.40%	282
	2008	105	56.15%	21	11.23%	61	32.62%	187
	2009	187	58.44%	37	11.56%	96	30.00%	320
	2010	126	72.41%	25	14.37%	23	13.22%	174
	2011	215	61.25%	67	19.09%	69	19.66%	351
					Cold War Era	Relative Period of Peace	Period of War	Total Period
Mean DoD Witnesses					182.86	201.60	156.86	178.21
Mean Other Govt Witnesses					64.57	50.60	34.29	49.74
Mean Non Govt Witnesses					55.57	70.00	67.29	63.68
Mean Total Number of Witnesses					303	322.2	258.43	291.63
DoD Witnesses Trendline Slope					13.25	-9.40	3.77	-0.29
Other Govt Witnesses Trendline Slope					-1.86	-6.90	2.54	-0.70
Non-Govt Witnesses Trendline Slope					5.07	-1.90	-2.95	0.32
Total Number of Witnesses Trendline Slope					16.46	-18.2	3.35	-0.67
Avg DoD Percentage, Total FY Witnesses					63.06%	62.27%	59.34%	62.27%
Avg Other Govt Percentage, Total FY Witnesses					20.85%	15.70%	11.41%	16.56%
Avg Non Govt Percentage, Total FY Witnesses					16.10%	22.03%	29.25%	21.71%
					DoD	Other Govt	Non-Govt	Total Witnesses
Trendline Slope (1966–2011)					-0.29	-0.70	0.32	-0.67
Trendline Slope (1997–2011)					-3.24	-1.01	-1.07	-5.32

I. NUMBER OF GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. Assertion

Jones and Bixler (1992) assert the data they collected during the Cold War era, specifically the number of general provisions in authorization and appropriation public laws, reveal a trend in increased use of other forms of congressional budget controls by Congress to control the DoD budget.

According to Jones and Bixler (1992), the increased number of reports, studies, and other actions requested by Congress from the DoD between 1970 and 1991 is evidence to support the assertion that control by Congress over the DoD has steadily increased since 1950 (p. 85). The reasoning behind the reporting requirements is a need by Congress to determine the status of programs and activities within the DoD (Johannes, 1985, p. 589). According to Johannes (1985), although many reporting requirements have limited utility, "Regularly, the findings of studies were used to draft and defend bills or amendments, or to prepare speeches. Some of the measures became law" (p. 593). Essentially, the increased reporting requirements not only increased the burden on the DoD to provide reports to Congress concerning individual programs or appropriations, they may have also served to feed the increase in overall size of legislation during the same period.

2. Data Organization

The data in Table 11 was adapted from Jones and Bixler's (1992) Table 4.12 (p. 78) and extended through FY 2011. The data for the number of general provisions to DoD authorization and appropriation public laws for FY 1992–2011 was determined by referencing the respective public law in the U.S. Congress United States Statutes at Large publication and recording the actual page count. To ensure consistency of data collection, the Jones and Bixler (1992) data for 1970–1980 were verified using the same methodology. Although there were some minor differences in page counts between the authors' data and Jones and Bixler's data, the authors chose to keep Jones and Bixler's published data to ensure consistency with other published data sources. However, the authors did correct arithmetic errors in the table when discovered.

3. Data Presentation

Table 11 shows the number of general provisions for the years 1970–2011. Figure 7 displays the number of general provisions to DoD authorization and appropriation public laws broken down into three separate data series with associated trend lines. The first data series (blue boxes) represents Jones and Bixler's Cold War era data, the second (green boxes) represents a relative period of peace, and the third (red boxes) represents a period of war.

Table 11. Number of General Provisions (FY 1970–2011) (After: Jones & Bixler, 1992, FY 1970–1991; DoD Appropriations Act, FY 1992–1995; DoD Appropriations Act, FY 1996–2011; NDAA, FY 1992–1993; NDAA, FY 1994–2011)

Cold War Era		Relative Period of Peace		Period of War	
FY	General Provisions	FY	General Provisions	FY	General Provisions
1970	64	1992	300	2002	291
1971	70	1993	298	2003	250
1972	69	1994	285	2004	245
1973	73	1995	285	2005	289
1974	87	1996	285	2006	312
1975	87	1997	259	2007	233
1976	96	1998	261	2008	247
1977	87	1999	257	2009	225
1978	106	2000	302	2010	246
1979	109	2001	351	2011	199
1980	121				
1981	129				
1982	150				
1983	170				
1984	223				
1985	192				
1986	217				
1987	237				
1988	236				
1989	216				
1990	207				
1991	271				

	Cold War Era	Relative Period of Peace	Period of War
Mean	146.23	288.30	253.70
Median	125	285	246.5
R-Squared	0.92	0.027	0.390
Standard Deviation	67.22	27.8	34.11
Trendline Slope	9.90	1.51	-7.04

Trendline Slope (1970–2011)	5.52
Trendline Slope (1992–2011)	-3.29

4. Data Analysis

Jones and Bixler found the number of general provisions to DoD authorization and appropriation increased throughout the Cold War. Expanding the data set, looking across the entire 1970 to 2011 period, there was an overall increase in those 50 years. However, for the relative period of peace the number of general provisions rate of increase slowed considerably essentially plateauing and for the period of war the number of general provisions declined sharply. Jones and Bixler's assertion remains valid across the full 50-year period and is invalid when looking at the last 20 years.

The number of general provisions to DoD authorization and appropriation for the Cold War increased at a rate of 9.90 provisions per year. The relative period of peace the rate slightly increased at 1.51 provisions per year supporting Jones and Bixler's assertion. The period of war has a decreasing rate of 7.04 provisions per year not supporting Jones and Bixler's assertion. Of note, since FY 2007, the number of general provisions has steadily decreased to 230 provisions on average (50 provision reduction) comparable with late 1980s levels. The last 20 years decreased at 3.29 general provisions per year invalidating Jones and Bixler's assertion. The overall historical trend (FY 1970–2011) increased at 5.52 provisions per year as Jones and Bixler's assertion remains valid regarding Congress' increase in the amount of control exerted over the DoD with the number of general provisions to DoD authorizations and appropriations.




Figure 11. Number of General Provisions (1970–2011)

J. NUMBER OF CONGRESSIONAL STAFF MEMBERS

1. Assertion

Jones and Bixler (1992) assert that the "growth in the size and expertise of congressional staffs appears to have played a major role in increasing the micromanagement of the DoD budget by Congress" (p. 113).

According to Jones and Bixler (1992),

Factors to explain the growth of Congressional staffs include the complexity of issues confronted by Congress, self-imposed increases in Congressional workloads, the critical need for staff support to accomplish anything in Congress, increased activity by members of Congress in proposing legislation, expansion in the numbers of committees and subcommittees, a steady rise in Congressional-executive political confrontation, growth in Congressional reporting requirements, and mistrust of executive-branch budget strategy and tactics (p. 118).

Jones and Bixler (1992) also concluded that the Cold War era data they collected regarding the staff size of the House, Senate, HASC, SASC, HAC and SAC "indicate that the growth in the congressional staff has generally coincided with the increase in size of the federal budget" (p. 114).

2. Data Organization

The data in Tables 12, 13, and 14 were adapted from Jones and Bixler's (1992) Table 5.2 and 5.4 (p. 114, 118) and extended through FY 2005. The data for the number of congressional staff members (House, Senate, HASC, SASC, HAC, and SAC) for FY 1990–2005 were adapted from Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin (2008, p. 110). Due to time constraints the authors were unable to extend the data from Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin (2008) through FY 2011.

3. Data Presentation

Tables 12, 13, and 14 show the number of congressional staff members (House and Senate, HASC and SASC, HAC and SAC respectively) for FY 1957–2005. Figures 12 (House and Senate), 13 (HASC and SASC), and 14 (HAC and SAC) display the congressional staff members broken down into three separate data series with associated trend lines. In all three figures, the House is represented by a square symbol while the Senate is represented by a triangle symbol. The first data series (blue) represents Jones and Bixler's Cold War era data, the second (green) represents a relative period of peace, and the third (red) represents a period of war.

Table 12. Total Number of House and Senate Staff Members (FY 1957–2005)
(After: Jones & Bixler, 1992, FY 1957–1989; Ornstein, Mann, & Malbin, 2008, FY 1990–2005)

Cold War Era			Relative Period of Peace			Period of War		
FY	House	Senate	FY	House	Senate	FY	House	Senate
1957	2441	1115	1993	7400	4138	2002	7263	4024
1967	4055	1749	1995	7186	4247	2003	7048	3998
1968			1997	7282	4410	2004	6742	3687
1969			1999	7216	4272	2005	6804	3934
1970			2001	7209	3994			
1971								
1972	5280	2426						
1973								
1974								
1975								
1976	6939	3251						
1977	6942	3554						
1978	6944	3268						
1979	7067	3593						
1980	7371	3746						
1981	7487	3945						
1982	7511	4041						
1983	7606	4059						
1984	7385	3949						
1985	7528	4097						
1986	7920	3744						
1987	7584	4075						
1988	7564	3977						
1989	7569	3837						
1990								
1991	7278	4294						

Cold War Era	Mean	6803.94	3484.44
	Median	7378.00	3791.50
	R-Squared	0.84	0.88
	Standard Deviation	1436.41	868.20
	Trendline Slope	156.59	97.27

Relative Period of Peace	Mean	7258.60	4212.20
	Median	7216.00	4247.00
	R-Squared	0.41	0.07
	Standard Deviation	86.73	155.75
	Trendline Slope	-17.60	-13.15

Period of War	Mean	6964.25	3910.75
	Median	6926.00	3966.00
	R-Squared	0.83	0.24
	Standard Deviation	238.98	153.89
	Trendline Slope	-168.30	-58.10

Trendline Slope (1957–2005)		59.78	49.35
Trendline Slope (1993–2005)		-41.74	-37.23

4. Data Analysis

a. House and Senate Staff Members

Jones and Bixler found the number of House and Senate staff members increased throughout the Cold War. Expanding the data set looking across the entire 1957 to 2005 period, there was an overall increase in those 50 years. However, for the relative period of peace the number of House and Senate staff members rate of increase stopped

and then slightly decreased. For the period of war the number of staff members decreasing rate significantly accelerated. Jones and Bixler's assertion remains valid across the full 50-year period and is invalid when looking at the last 20 years.

The number of House staff members for the Cold War significantly increased at a rate of 156.59 members per year and the number of Senate staff members significantly increased at a rate of 97.27 members per year. For the Cold War, the House staff members had a 37% greater growth rate than the Senate. For the relative period of peace, the number of House staff members decreased at a rate of 17.60 members per year and the number of Senate staff members decreased at a rate of 13.15 members per year, which does not support (neutral) Jones and Bixler's assertion. During the period of war, the number of House staff members significantly decreased at a rate of 168.30 members per year and the number of Senate staff members significantly decreased at a rate of 58.10 members per year not supporting Jones and Bixler's assertion. At FY 2005, the House and Senate staff members had been reduced to 6,804 and 3,934 staff members respectively bringing the House and Senate capacity levels lower when compared to the end of the Cold War era (7,278 and 4,294). For the last 20 years the House decreased at 41.74 staff members per year and the Senate decreased at 37.23 staff members per year invalidating Jones and Bixler's assertion.

Of note, due to the volume of increase in the House and Senate staff members during the Cold War era, the decreasing rate of staff members during the relative period of peace and the period of war reduced the overall historical trend (FY 1957–2005), but the overall historical trend has an increasing rate of the House staff at 59.78 members per year and the Senate staff at 49.35 members per year as Jones and Bixler's assertion remains valid regarding Congress' increase in the amount of control exerted over the DoD with the number of House and Senate staff members.

b. HASC and SASC Staff Members

Jones and Bixler found the number of HASC and SASC staff members increased throughout the Cold War. Expanding the data set looking across the entire 1960 to 2005 period, there was an overall increase in those 50 years. However, for the number

of HASC staff members the relative period of peace stopped the rate of increase from the Cold War, reversed, and started decreasing at a significant rate. For the period of war the rate of decrease stopped, reversed, and had an accelerated increasing rate. Jones and Bixler's assertion remains valid across the full 50-year period and is invalid when looking at the last 20 years. For the number of SASC staff members, the relative period of peace rate of increase stopped and plateaued and for the period of war the rate stopped plateauing and decreased. Jones and Bixler's assertion remains valid across the full 50-year period and is neutral when looking at the last 20 years.

The number of HASC staff members for the Cold War increased at a rate of 2.00 members per year and the number of SASC staff members increased at a rate of 1.09 members per year. During the relative period of peace, the number of HASC staff members significantly decreased at a rate of 2.45 members per year not supporting Jones and Bixler's assertion. The number of SASC staff member's plateaus, marginally increasing at a rate of 0.23 members per year, which does not support (neutral) Jones and Bixler's assertion. During the period of war, the number of HASC staff members increased, accelerating at a rate of 3.60 members per year supporting Jones and Bixler's assertion. The number of SASC staff members decreased at a rate of 0.60 members per year not supporting Jones and Bixler's assertion. For the last 20 years, the HASC decreased at 1.52 staff members per year invalidating Jones and Bixler's assertion while the SASC showed a marginal (neutral) increase of 0.41 members per year, not supporting Jones and Bixler's assertion. The overall historical trend (FY 1960–2005), revealed the number of HASC staff members increased at 0.67 members per year and the number of SASC staff members increased at 0.72 per year as Jones and Bixler's assertion remains valid regarding Congress' increase in the amount of control exerted over the DoD with the number of HASC and SASC staff members.

c. HAC and SAC Staff Members

Jones and Bixler found the number of HAC and SAC staff members increased throughout the Cold War. Expanding the data set looking across the entire 1960 to 2005 period, there was an overall increase in those 50 years. However, for the number

of HAC staff members, the relative period of peace stopped the rate of increase from the Cold War, reversed, and had a significant decreasing rate. For the period of war the rate of decrease stopped, reversed, and had a substantially increasing rate. Jones and Bixler's assertion remains valid across the full 50-year period and invalid when looking at the last 20 years. For the number of SAC staff members, the relative period of peace rate of increase strengthened and for the period of war the rate significantly increased. Jones and Bixler's assertion remains valid across the full 50-year period and remains valid when looking at the last 20 years.

The number of HAC staff members for the Cold War increased at a rate of 5.51 members per year and the number of SAC staff members increased at a rate of 2.01 members per year. During the relative period of peace the number of HAC staff members decreased at a rate of 6.80 members per year not supporting Jones and Bixler's assertion. The number of SAC staff members rate of increase amplified during the relative period of peace at a 2.58 members per year supporting Jones and Bixler's assertion. During the period of war the number of HAC staff members increased at a rate of 2.40 members per year and the number of SAC staff members increased at a significant rate of 5.20 members per year supporting Jones and Bixler's assertion. Of note, the SAC continues to add legislative capacity in all three-time periods where the HAC did not (relative period of peace). For the last 20 years the HAC decreased at 2.38 staff members per year not supporting Jones and Bixler's assertion and the SAC increased at 4.26 staff members per year supporting Jones and Bixler's assertion. For the overall historical trend (FY 1960–2005), the number of HAC staff increased at 1.99 members per year and the number of SAC staff increased at 1.17 members per year as Jones and Bixler's assertion remains valid regarding Congress' increase in the amount of control exerted over the DoD with the number of HAC and SAC staff members.

Table 13. Number of HASC and SASC Staff Members (FY 1960–2005) (After: Jones & Bixler, 1992, FY 1960–1989; Ornstein, Mann, & Malbin, 2008, FY 1990–2005)

Cold War Era			Relative Period of Peace			Period of War		
FY	HASC	SASC	FY	HASC	SASC	FY	HASC	SASC
1960	15	23	1993	76	50	2002	46	53
1963			1994	78	45	2003	54	52
1964			1995	44	43	2004	54	46
1965			1996	70	49	2005	58	53
1966			1997	60	49			
1967			1998	58	45			
1968			1999	57	48			
1969			2000	55	49			
1970	37	19	2001	53	49			
1971								
1972							HASC	SASC
1973					Mean		52.63	34.88
1974					Median		56.50	33.50
1975	38	30			R-Squared		0.95	0.79
1976					Standard Deviation		21.91	11.36
1977					Trendline Slope		2.00	1.09
1978								
1979		31			Mean		61.22	47.44
1980					Median		58.00	49.00
1981	49	36			R-Squared		0.36	0.07
1982					Standard Deviation		11.23	2.46
1983		41			Trendline Slope		-2.45	0.23
1984								
1985	64	48			Mean		53.00	51.00
1986					Median		54.00	52.50
1987	70				R-Squared		0.85	0.05
1988					Standard Deviation		5.03	3.37
1989	66	51			Trendline Slope		3.60	-0.60
1990								
1991	82				Trendline Slope (1960–2005)		0.67	0.72
					Trendline Slope (1993–2005)		-1.52	0.41

Table 14. Number of HAC and SAC Staff Members (FY 1960–2005) (After: Jones & Bixler, 1992, FY 1960–1989; Ornstein, Mann, & Malbin, 2008, FY 1990–2005)

Cold War Era			Relative Period of Peace			Period of War		
FY	HAC	SAC	FY	HAC	SAC	FY	HAC	SAC
1960	59	31	1993	227	72	2002	158	96
1963			1994	202	70	2003	156	105
1964			1995	126	60	2004	162	112
1965			1996	143	59	2005	164	111
1966			1997	156	76			
1967			1998	152	70			
1968			1999	158	79			
1969			2000	147	80			
1970	71	42	2001	148	91			
1971								
1972							HAC	SAC
1973							Mean	144.33
1974							Median	160.00
1975	98	72					R-Squared	0.92
1976							Standard Deviation	57.85
1977							Trendline Slope	5.51
1978								
1979		80					Mean	162.11
1980							Median	152.00
1981	127	79					R-Squared	0.34
1982							Standard Deviation	31.73
1983	160	82					Trendline Slope	-6.80
1984								
1985	182	82					Mean	160.00
1986							Median	160.00
1987	188						R-Squared	0.72
1988							Standard Deviation	3.65
1989	196	80					Trendline Slope	2.40
1990								
1991	218						Trendline Slope (1960–2005)	1.99
							Trendline Slope (1993–2005)	-2.38




Figure 12. Total Number of House and Senate Staff Members (FY 1957–2005)




Figure 13. Number HASC and SASC Staff Members (FY 1960–2005)




Figure 14. Number of HAC and SAC Staff Members (FY 1960–2005)

K. NUMBER OF CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT AGENCY STAFF

1. Assertion

Jones and Bixler assert that the capabilities and expertise of personnel on congressional staffs "has been enhanced by the creation and growth of various legislative support agencies charged with providing information and analysis of issues, proposals, and policy options to Congress" (p. 120) and that the trend in increased micromanagement of the DoD budget by Congress during the Cold War Era was related to the increase in the "size and expertise of congressional staffs" (p. 113).

2. Data Organization

The data in Table 15 was adapted from Jones and Bixler's (1992) Table 5.5 (p. 123) and extended through FY 2005. The data for the number of congressional support agency staff members for FY 1990–2005 were adapted from Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin (2008, p. 110). Due to time constraints the authors were unable to extend the data from Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin (2008) through FY 2011.

3. Data Presentation

Table 15 shows the number of congressional support agency staff members for the years 1960–2005. Figures 15, 16, and 17 display the number of congressional support agency staff members (CRS, GAO, and CBO respectively) broken down into three separate data series with associated trend lines. The first data series (blue boxes) represents Jones and Bixler's Cold War era data, the second (green boxes) represents a relative period of peace, and the third (red boxes) represents a period of war.

Table 15. Number of Congressional Support Agency Staff (FY 1960–2005) (After: Jones & Bixler, 1992, FY 1960–1989; Ornstein, Mann, & Malbin, 2008, FY 1990–2005)

Cold War Era				Relative Period of Peace				Period of War			
FY	CRS	GAO	CBO	FY	CRS	GAO	CBO	FY	CRS	GAO	CBO
1960	183	5074		1992	838	5,062	218	2002	681	3,275	232
1961				1993	835	4,958	230	2003	692	3,269	236
1962				1994	740	4,572	218	2004	729	3,252	236
1963				1995	746	4,342	214	2005	700	3,215	235
1964				1996	747	3,677	232				
1965	231	4278		1997	726	3,500	232				
1966				1998							
1967				1999	703	3,275	232				
1968				2000							
1969				2001	722	3,155	228				
1970	332	4,704									
1971	386	4,718									
1972	479	4,742									
1973	596	4,908									
1974	687	5,270									
1975	741	4,905	193								
1976	806	5,391	203								
1977	789	5,315	201								
1978	818	5,476	203								
1979	847	5,303	207								
1980	868	5,196	218								
1981	849	5,182	218								
1982	849	5,027	218								
1983	853	4,960	211								
1984	858	4,985	210								
1985	860	5,042	222								
1986	860	5,019	222								
1987	860	5,016	226								
1988	825	5,042	211								
1989	860	5,063	226								
1990	797	5,066	226								
1991	831	5,054	226								

Cold War Era		CRS	GAO	CBO
Cold War Era	Mean	711.04	5030.67	214.18
	Median	821.50	5042.00	218.00
	R-Squared	0.73	0.12	0.72
	Standard Deviation	218.71	254.38	10.27
	Trendline Slope	23.26	10.75	1.72

Relative Period of Peace		CRS	GAO	CBO
Relative Period of Peace	Mean	757.13	4067.63	225.50
	Median	743.00	4009.50	229.00
	R-Squared	0.66	0.91	0.26
	Standard Deviation	51.07	760.37	7.54
	Trendline Slope	-13.58	-238.00	1.26

Period of War		CRS	GAO	CBO
Period of War	Mean	700.50	3252.75	234.75
	Median	696.00	3260.50	235.50
	R-Squared	0.35	0.89	0.38
	Standard Deviation	20.53	26.99	1.89
	Trendline Slope	9.40	-19.70	0.90

		CRS	GAO	CBO
Trendline Slope (1960–2005)		7.81	-43.92	1.10
Trendline Slope (1992–2005)		-8.83	-142.76	1.22




Figure 15. Number of Congressional Support Agency Staff: CRS (FY 1960–2005)




Figure 16. Number of Congressional Support Agency Staff: GAO (FY 1960–2005)




Figure 17. Number of Congressional Support Agency Staff: CBO (FY 1975–2005)

4. Data Analysis

a. CRS Staff Members

Jones and Bixler found the number of congressional support CRS staff members increased throughout the Cold War. Expanding the data set looking across the entire 1960 to 2005 period, there was an overall increase in those 50 years. However, for the relative period of peace the number of CRS staff members continues to plateau from the Cold War and then starts a decreasing rate. For the period of war the rate of decrease stops, reverses and subsequently increases. Jones and Bixler’s assertion remains valid across the full 50-year period and is invalid when looking at the last 20 years.

The number of CRS staff members for the Cold War increased at a rate of 23.26 members per year. During the relative period of peace the number of CRS staff members decreased at a rate of 13.58 members per year not supporting Jones and Bixler’s assertion. During the period of war the number of CRS staff members increased at a rate of 9.40 members per year supporting Jones and Bixler’s assertion. Of note, the rapid rate of increase of CRS staff members was from 1970 to 1980 (from 330 to 860 members a 160% increase) and for the rest of the Cold War era (1980s), the number of CRS staff

members plateaued. From the mean of the Cold War through the period of war, there is a decreasing percentage of CRS staff members (negative 1.54%), however, due to the rise of CRS staff during the Cold War the overall trend is positive. The last 20 years decreased at 8.83 CRS staff members per year not supporting Jones and Bixler's assertion. The overall historical trend (FY 1960–2005) increased at a rate of 7.81 CRS staff members per year as Jones and Bixler's assertion remains valid regarding Congress' increase in the amount of control exerted over the DoD with the number of congressional support CRS staff members.

b. GAO Staff Members

Jones and Bixler found the number of congressional support GAO staff members increased throughout the Cold War. Expanding the data set looking across the entire 1960 to 2005 period, there was an overall decrease in those 50 years. However, for the relative period of peace the number of GAO staff members rate of increase stopped and started a significantly decreasing rate while during the period of war the rate of decrease slowed. Jones and Bixler's assertion is invalid across the full 50-year period and is invalid when looking at the last 20 years.

The number of GAO staff members for the Cold War increased at a rate of 10.75 members per year. During the relative period of peace the number of GAO staff members significantly decreased at a rate of 238.00 members per year not supporting Jones and Bixler's assertion. Overall, GAO staff was significantly reduced by 19% during the relative period of peace. During the period of war the number of GAO staff members decreased at a rate of 19.70 members per year not supporting Jones and Bixler's assertion. The last 20 years decreased at 3.29 GAO staff members not supporting Jones and Bixler's assertion. The overall historical trend (FY 1960–2005), decreased at 7.81 GAO staff members per year as Jones and Bixler's assertion is not valid regarding Congress' increase in the amount of control exerted over the DoD with the number of congressional support GAO staff members.

c. CBO Staff Members

Jones and Bixler found the number of congressional support CBO staff members increased throughout the Cold War. Expanding the data set looking across the entire 1960 to 2005 period, there been an overall increase in those 50 years. However, for the relative period of peace the number of CBO staff members rate of increase slowed and for the period of war the rate of increase continued to slow. Jones and Bixler's assertion remains valid across the full 50-year period and remains valid when looking at the last 20 years.

The number of CBO staff members for the Cold War increased at a rate of 1.72 members per year. During the relative period of peace the number of CBO staff members increased at a slower rate of 1.26 members per year supporting Jones and Bixler's assertion. During the period of war the number of CBO staff members rate of growth continued to slow at a rate of 0.90 members per year supporting Jones and Bixler's assertion. The last 20 years increased at 1.22 CBO staff members per year supporting Jones and Bixler's assertion. The overall historical trend (FY 1960–2005), increased at 1.10 CBO staff members per year as Jones and Bixler's assertion remains valid regarding Congress' increase in the amount of control exerted over the DoD with the number of congressional support CBO staff members.

L. CHAPTER CONCLUSION

Chapter III looked at Jones and Bixler's assertions regarding some of the methods Congress utilizes to control the defense budget, specifically legislative, oversight, and capacity factors. The data analysis supports the majority of Jones and Bixler's assertions when extended from the Cold War including the relative period of peace and the period of war. Chapter IV will reveal this thesis's results and recommendations for further study.

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IV. CONCLUSIONS

A. SUMMARY

The primary research question addressed by this thesis was to determine whether the trends and assertions observed by Jones and Bixler remained valid beyond their period of study. Current congressional control literature was reviewed, Jones and Bixler's assertions were given, and data was collected, organized, presented, and analyzed to determine if their assertions remained valid, invalid or were neutral. Table 16 summarizes the chapter three analysis.

Looking at the literature review during the past 20 years of this study, the authors conclude Congress has increased their capacity to control the Department of Defense budget through the use of statutory, nonstatutory, and other controls. However, there appears to be a limit to this legislative capacity. The majority of various DoD authorization and appropriation bills and committee reports have seen peaks in capacity levels followed by plateaus or reductions. Formal and informal information collected by Congress (oversight) has seen capacity increases but the type of information collected appears to be changing (shift in witness category called to testify). Overall, Congress is exercising more control from the Cold War era through this period of study.

If one looks across the full period of study, the majority (90%) of Jones and Bixler's assertions evaluated remain valid. However, looking at only the last 20 years, 63% of their assertions are either invalid or neutral. For the relative period of peace, 68% of their assertions are either invalid or neutral and for the period of war, 47% are either invalid or neutral. The authors inferred from the data that during the last 20 years there has not been a general increase, rather there has been a change in Congress' use of statutory, nonstatutory, and other forms of congressional budget controls to control the DoD budget.

The purpose of this thesis was to extend Jones and Bixler's Cold War era data to the most current, readily available data. This thesis is not a study to determine the specific reasons why congressional control measures could be changing, but this thesis

analyzed the past 20 years of appropriate data applying the results to Jones and Bixler's Cold War data. However, this thesis will present recommendations for further study resulting from trends identified during analysis that could lead to those reasons.

B. LIMITATIONS

The authors of the thesis had one limitation during the data collection phase: lack of available data for study elements.

Jones and Bixler (1992) and the authors were unable to locate reliable data for the following:

- HASC and SASC hearings (no data from 1973–1996)
- HASC and SASC witnesses (no data from 1973–1996)
- Congressional staffing (data not updated post-2005)

The data collected for the HASC and SASC hearings and witnesses accounted for less than 50% of the total data available. Readers are cautioned to limit any conclusions they reach because of the incomplete data.

Table 16. Analysis Summary Table

Data Point	Jones and Bixler Cold War Analysis	Full Period	Relative Period of Peace	Post 9/11 Period of War	Last 20 Years
Number of Pages in Defense Authorization Bills	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑
Number of Pages in Defense Appropriations Bills	↑	↑	↓	↔	↔
Number of Pages in HASC Defense Authorization Report	↑	↑	↑	↔	↑
Number of Pages in SASC Defense Authorization Report	↑	↑	↑	↓	↑
Number of Pages in HAC Defense Appropriation Report	↑	↑	↔	↑	↑
Number of Pages in SAC Defense Appropriation Report	↑	↑	↓	↑	↔
Number of HASC Hearings	↑	↑	↓	↑	↑
Number of SASC Hearings	↑	↑	↓	↔	↓
Number of Witnesses Before the HASC and SASC	↑	↔	↓	↑	↓
Number of General Provisions	↑	↑	↑	↓	↓
Number of Congressional Staff Members: House	↑	↑	↔	↓	↓
Number of Congressional Staff Members: Senate	↑	↑	↔	↓	↓
Number of Congressional Staff Members: HASC	↑	↑	↓	↑	↓
Number of Congressional Staff Members: SASC	↑	↑	↔	↓	↔
Number of Congressional Staff Members: HAC	↑	↑	↓	↑	↓
Number of Congressional Staff Members: SAC	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑
Number of Congressional Support Agency Staff: CRS	↑	↑	↓	↑	↓
Number of Congressional Support Agency Staff: GAO	↑	↓	↓	↓	↓
Number of Congressional Support Agency Staff: CBO	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑
		Legend:	↑ ↓ ↔	Remains Valid Invalid Neutral	

C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

1. Congressional Control Spike During 1980s

Some of the measures changed at a time other than the strategically important periods of time defined in this study and may be more affected by other factors regarding changes in congressional control starting in the mid 1980s. Figures 1, 2, 3, and 11 display relatively flat trend lines until the 1980s when they started to increase sharply. Future research should explore the reason(s) for the increase in the 1980s congressional control, specifically as to whether the Reagan administration DoD buildup may have been responsible. There have been other periods of war and defense buildups without an increase in congressional control/legislation, but it could be a factor.

Additionally, research should explore whether this change was related to circumstances that led to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Pub. L.99-433) or the rise in absolute and relative defense spending levels. Both occurred at approximately the same time as the shift in the data.

2. Congressional Capacity: Staff Size

Data analysis revealed trends regarding congressional capacity, specifically the number of House, Senate, HASC, SASC, HAC, and SAC staff members and the number of congressional support staff members (CRS, GAO, and CBO).

Figures 12, 13, and 14 reveal that the majority of congressional staff sizes peaked at the end of the Cold War with the SASC and SAC being the two exceptions. Since the data for the House and Senate trend differently, a possible explanation is the shift in power in the House in the mid-1990s and the new Republican majority's goal under the Contract with America.

Congressional support staff (Figures 15 and 16, CRS and GAO) follows the same decreasing trend in staff size following the Cold War, while the CBO (Figure 17) staff size increased in all periods. Future studies should analyze why most staffs decreased post-Cold War, despite an increase in overall legislative output. Further, research should explore why one staff agency, the CBO, grew while the other staff agencies, the GAO

and CRS, experienced a steady decline in size. It is likely that as the size of the defense budget relative to the overall budget decreased, factors other than defense primarily determine their size. Perhaps the shift in emphasis on staffs indicates more policy (domestic and defense) is exercised through the budget than other legislative functions.

3. Congressional Capacity: Legislative Throughput

Further research should explore whether the steady trend in the size of bills and reports has slowed or reversed due to changes in committee and member staff size. It seems reasonable to assume that a smaller staff would produce less legislative output. Looking at individual staffs and legislative outputs (taking total bill type volume divided by total corresponding staff size) would be useful when comparing staff differences in output. Both the HASC and SASC on average produce more than eight pages of legislation per staff member more than the HAC and SAC. A snapshot during the period of war reveals the HASC and SASC averaged 11.36 pages per staff member while the HAC and SAC averaged 3.05 pages per staff member. Similar ratios are applicable for each individual period (relative period of peace; period of war) and the entire timeframe. Are authorization committees more “productive” than appropriation committees when writing legislation? Is it significant that the SAC is more “productive” than the HAC while the HASC is more “productive” than the SASC?

4. Congressional Oversight: HASC and SASC Witnesses

The data reveals changes in the types of witnesses called to testify. Although the total number of DoD witnesses has remained relatively constant over for the entire period, the number of non-defense government witnesses decreased by 9% and non-government witnesses increased by 11% since the end of the Cold War. Further research should inquire why the legislature has relied more on non-government witnesses, which industries or interests these witnesses represented, and what information they provided Congress. Such a study should also look at whether there has been a change in the type of government witnesses.

5. Congressional Oversight: Legislation Page Count

The HASC and SASC authorization bills (Figures 3 and 4) showed an increasing trend during the Cold War era and relative period of peace, but the increase stops and starts a decreasing trend during the period of war. The HAC and SAC appropriation bills (Figure 5 and 6) both showed increasing trends for the Cold War era and period of war but differed during the relative period of peace. During the relative period of peace the HAC trend plateaued while the SAC decreased sharply. The sizes of the authorization and appropriation bills trended in opposite directions for the past 20 years. Appropriation bills appear to follow levels of defense budget authority but defense authorizations bills do not. Additionally, the shape of the appropriation bills appears to correlate positively with the amount of budget authority for defense spending but authorization bills do not. Further inquiry should look for causes for the differences between the respective bills.

6. Data Analysis: Additional Jones and Bixler (1992) Chapters

During this study the authors focused primarily on the assertions made in Jones and Bixler (1992) Chapters 4 and 5. Future research should extend other portions of Jones and Bixler's analysis, looking deeper into the trends and assertions made in other areas of their research.

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